Abstract: This paper discusses the gain in efficiency from including deforestation risk as a targeting criterion in payments for environmental services (PES) programs. We contrast two payment schemes that we simulate using data from Mexican common property forests: a flat payment scheme with a cap on allowable hectares, similar to the program implemented in several countries, and a payment that takes deforestation risk into account. We simulate the latter strategy both with and without a budget constraint. Using observed past deforestation, we find that while risk-targeted payments are far more efficient, flat payments are more egalitarian. We also consider the characteristics of communities receiving payments from both programs. We find that the risk-weighted scheme results in more, though smaller, payments to poor communities, and these payments are more efficient than those to non-poor ejidos. In the flat scheme, payments to poor and non-poor are equal, though they receive less of the budget than in the more efficient program.
Introduction
Programs of payments for environmental services (PES) 2 are becoming an increasingly popular way of creating, conserving, and restoring natural resources throughout the world. Mayrand and Paquin (2004) inventoried more than 300 such schemes. In recent years, PES programs have increasingly become managed by developing countries, with one of the earliest efforts occurring in Costa Rica in 1997, and pilot programs mushrooming throughout Latin America and Asia (World Bank, 2005) . Payments for the conservation of standing forests are among the most numerous of such programs in developing countries. The targeting strategy in these programs has been to pay a flat fee per hectare of standing forest, where the forest owners whose forests fall in specific geographical regions voluntarily enroll hectares but where there is a limit on the number of allowable hectares.
Examples of this type of targeting can be found in Mexico, Costa Rica (Zbinden and Lee, 2005) , and Ecuador (Echavarría, 2002) , among others. China's "Grain for Green" and the US Conservation
Reserve programs also implement flat payment strategies, although they pay for conservation activities such as reforestation rather than standing forests (Uchida et al, 2005) . The appeal of this sort of strategy clearly lies in its transparency, ease of implementation, and impression of fairness.
Unfortunately, it is highly unlikely that one could find a situation in which such a scheme would maximize the environmental benefits accrued per dollar spent. Given limited budgets for conservation, the search for an efficient, readily implementable targeting scheme is imperative. In this paper we use the case of Mexico to illustrate the efficiency gain in including the risk of deforestation in the targeting criteria for payments for environmental amenities provided by standing forest.
There is a growing literature on cost effective targeting of conservation programs, much of it inspired by the US Conservation Reserve Program (Babcock et al, 1996 (Babcock et al, , 1997 . The main preoccupation of much of the current research is with the proper way to measure environmental 2 Such programs are also known as programs of payments for environmental amenities, conservation payments and environmental service payments.
amenities. Several economists have proposed biodiversity metrics, including Weitzman's (1998) expected genetic diversity ranking, Ando et al's (1998) total species measure, and Ferraro's (2004) distance function approach. Ferraro (2003) compares the impacts of several different index measurements for water quality benefits, and finds that all of them are highly correlated.
Our addition to this discussion is to point out that no matter what the choice of amenity measure, it is a waste of money to pay for amenities which are at no risk of being lost. Mexico provides an excellent opportunity for studying payments for services provided by forests, in large part because it is in the early stages of implementing a nationwide PES program for standing forest.
Presently, 80% of the country's forests are located in ejidos. These communities, which were created by the post-Revolution land reform, hold their forestry and grazing lands in common property. Their large share of national forest holdings makes them an essential place where to begin addressing the deforestation problem.
Using data obtained from a 2002 ejido survey, we compare two targeting strategies for payments. The benchmark case is a payment per hectare with a cap on allowable hectares. We compare this design to a program which incorporates deforestation risk, showing how risk-targeted payments might be distributed with and without a budget constraint. In the former situation, payments of the opportunity cost are given only for those hectares of forest that are at risk of deforestation. The total budget of this program is used to provide a point of comparison for the other two programs. First, the magnitude of the flat payments is established in order to give the same total expenditures as in the opportunity cost program. Second, two-thirds of this budget gives the constraint for the final program, in which payments are distributed in order to maximize the environmental benefits per dollar spent.
The main result of these simulations is that while the benchmark scheme is very egalitarian, it is highly inefficient. The unconstrained risk-targeted program generates more than three times the environmental benefits at the same cost as the flat payments program. Simulation of the program which maximizes the environmental benefits per dollar spent increases efficiency over the flat payments program by over four times. The intuition behind the result is simple: paying everyone to preserve their forest may achieve the goal of income redistribution, but at a high cost -much of the payments will go to forests which even in the absence of incentive schemes would remain standing.
We also illustrate how to avoid strategic behavior on the part of recipients by conducting a final simulation which uses the predicted rather than actual risk to implement the last program, we find that there are errors in targeting, but that efficiency is still much greater than in a flat payments program.
Since policymaking is both about efficiency and equity, we also analyze the distributional impacts of the first and the last schemes that we consider. The results show that the budget from the flat payments program is more equitably distributed amongst ejidos of different size and poverty classes, while the optimal program allocates more funds to larger and poorer communities. The optimal program, however, gives smaller payments to poor ejidos on a per capita basis, while flat payments per capita are equal for the poor and non-poor.
The paper proceeds as follows: we first describe the theoretical considerations behind the different targeting strategies we consider, which leads us to the empirical strategy discussed in section 3. Section 4 describes the data to be used for the simulations and section 5 gives the results. Section 6 discusses some practical considerations for the implementation of our most efficient strategy and the last section concludes.
Alternative payment schemes -theoretical considerations
There are many possible ways of designing an environmental payment scheme. Any variation in design will change the kind of environmental services obtained and the people who receive payments.
Conceptually, there are an upper and a lower bound on the "prices" which one can pay per hectare in a PES program: the opportunity cost of the land and the value of the environmental services provided by the land. In this section we discuss some principles that apply regardless of the program design chosen.
Basic principles
Two criteria essential for the establishment of a PES program are targeting and the magnitude of the payments. In theory, these should be jointly defined to maximize environmental benefits for a given budget and therefore the optimal scheme depends upon the response function of the recipients, in this case, the ejidos. To formalize, let U F e − ΔF e , c e ΔF e ; z e ( ) be the utility an ejido e derives from the standing forest, F e − ΔF e , and the income generated by deforesting a quantity ΔF e , where c e is its opportunity cost per hectare and z e are ejido characteristics. The optimal deforestation level is thus a function of the initial standing forest, the opportunity cost, and the ejido characteristics:
The offer from the PES program is to not deforest at all against a total payment of P e . The ejido will thus accept the contract if:
Let P e ,min be the minimum value that satisfies this condition. Given the environmental benefit b e provided per hectare in ejido e, the optimal transfer scheme under the budget constraint P is the solution to: If one looks at the formulae above, the optimal contract only pays for the hectares that would otherwise be deforested, ΔF F e , c e , z e ( ) , which varies with the deforestation rate. In actuality, one frequently observes a flat payment per hectare of currently standing forest F e with a cap. In many places, this payment varies with quality of forest in terms of benefits, but the point here is that it does not depend on the deforestation rate. An argument in favor of this flat payment is the simplicity of implementation and the impression of fairness that it gives, as it does not take into account deforestation behavior.
Regardless of the choice of targeting scheme, the contract must be made over the entire area of the ejido. Neglecting this consideration could lead to "slippage" (a term coined by Wu (2000) ), that is, if a contract is incomplete, then deforestation may simply be transferred from a contracted to an uncontracted area of forest. Hence, typically, the contract should specify a payment against no deforestation on all of the hectares that have an opportunity cost below their environmental benefits.
Proposed simulations
In this section we specify the alternative payment schemes that will be simulated. Building from our theoretical considerations, we have selected 3 payment schemes: payments are set at a rate that gives the same aggregate budget as Rc, 3. A targeting that maximizes environmental benefits per dollar paid using an index of environmental benefits (as opposed to actual benefits in dollar terms) and a payment at opportunity cost for each hectare at risk, for a given budget (here arbitrarily set at 2/3 of the budget of the first scheme to illustrate how the budget constraint could be optimally dealt with)
[C].
Flat payment, F
We here assume a flat payment of r per hectare, up to a maximum of F hectares:
. P e,F is the total payment to ejido e , which is the rate per hectare multiplied by either the sum of forest hectares of type j or by the maximum allowable hectares. Assume that there is a constant deforestation rate τ ej of forest of category j in the ejido, and that the opportunity cost of a hectare of land in the ejido is c e . All ejidos are offered a contract, but an ejido will only accept the contract and thus participate in the scheme if the opportunity cost of the area it would otherwise deforest is less than the offer:
In order to facilitate comparison of the schemes, the rate r is established at the level that equalizes the total budget to the budget of the scheme Rc, which pays the opportunity cost for each hectare of land at risk of deforestation and will be detailed in the next section. It thus solves for:
Rental of hectares at risk, R c
We allow for heterogeneity of environmental benefits within ejidos. Each hectare of forest is characterized by an environmental benefit b j . Ideally, one would prefer an actual monetary value for the environmental benefits offered by a given piece of land. In reality, however, this is quite difficult to establish, as markets are missing for these services. So, for the purpose of our simulations, we establish an index value b j that allows the ranking of each hectare of forest by its relative environmental value.
Note that this does not allow us to exclude lands whose true environmental value is less than the opportunity cost.
Let F ej be the number of hectares with environmental benefits b j in ejido e, with F ej j ∑ = F e the total forest area in ejido e. The first year of the program, the unchallenged deforestation would convert τ ej F ej of forest of quality j into pasture. The second year, an additional τ ej of the remaining forest 1 − τ ej ( ) F ej would be converted, and similarly the following years. The deforested area after t years would thus be:
If the program is to prevent deforestation over the years, it should thus "rent" an increasing share of the forest. Payments based on the opportunity cost, assuming that the environmental benefits of all hectares exceed the cost, would be:
Because we are paying exactly their opportunity cost for the hectares of land they wish to deforest, ejidos will always accept the contract. The participating ejidos are those that would otherwise deforest. Note that the contract is for no deforestation on the total initial ejido area with opportunity cost below environmental benefits. Hence the area enrolled in the contract is . In the rest of the paper, since we are only concerned with comparing programs, we will only consider the first year of payment, and leave out the t superscript. Assuming that all communities have a fixed deforestation rate, or that any changes in the rate occur equally for all communities, calculating program outcomes for the first year will give us the same relative results for payment schemes that depend upon deforestation risk.
Note that by restricting ourselves to the first year of payments we are showing the flat payment scheme in the best possible light. That is to say, since the flat payments do not change over time and the opportunity cost does, the first year gives the maximum number of communities that will accept the payments at any given time. that the Mexican government was interested in introducing. The survey randomly sampled 407 ejidos larger than 100 hectares located in the forested regions of the country.
The total universe of ejidos with forest over 100 hectares is 7,679. The total amount of forest covered by our sample is 2,106,592 hectares of primary and secondary forest. Table 1 shows the distribution of communities across regions.
The sample included ejidos in all states with the exception of Baja California, Coahuila, Guanajuato, Zacatecas, Morelos, and Aguascalientes. In order to measure forest cover and its change over time, we use the Forest Inventories for 1994 and 2000, which were constructed by visual interpretation from satellite images with pixels of 30 meters at a scale of 1:250,000 (Velázquez et al., 2002) . In addition, we obtain slopes from digital elevation models with 100 meter pixels available from the Mexican government.
Overall, 86% of the ejidos in our sample currently have primary forest. The area of primary forests is largely related to ejido size, which varies considerably across ejidos. Total ejido area ranges from 180 to 170,143 hectares in our sample. The average percentage of a given ejido in primary forest is 34.7%.
On a per capita basis, the distribution of the forest is quite skewed. Though the average number of hectares per capita is 37, the median is 6.5 and the Gini coefficient .83. This suggests that any payment program disbursed on a per hectare basis will be similarly unequal in its distribution across communities and individual members.
The deforestation rate over the total forest in our sample is 1.2% per year from 1994 to 2000, which is comparable to what Torres and Flores (2001) term the "conservative estimate" of 1.3% per year. In our sample, the average ejido deforested about 1.3% per year over the period 1994-2000. 61% of the ejidos in the sample deforested over the study period, where deforestation is defined as the change from primary or secondary forest to agriculture or pasture. Amongst those who deforest, the average rate of forest loss is 2.1% per year.
Empirical results

Calculation of the cost
In order to measure the opportunity cost of forested land, we use the rainfed land rental rates reported in the 2002 ejido survey. Because ejido land cannot actually be rented, the numbers reported were the farmers' assessment of the land rental rate for a piece of land similar to the one that had been deforested. These rates were observed for those ejidos that experienced deforestation and refer to areas from which they had removed forest between 1994 and 2000. We consider this rate to be a fair estimate of the opportunity cost of the land that is most likely to be deforested, although it is likely not as accurate for the more remote areas of the ejido. Because this rate was not reported for some ejidos, we use as a measure of the opportunity cost the value of the rental rate predicted by the regression equation in table 2. The average rental rate is $103 US (sd $70) and the Gini coefficient of the per hectare rate is .37.
Calculation of the environmental benefits index
Ideally, b j should be expressed in monetary terms. This requires use of a valuation technique for services whose markets fail, or one of the techniques advocated by the authors mentioned in the introduction. For services where markets exist, such as hydrological benefits, values remain highly debated, with estimates ranging from $20/ha (Chomitz et al, 1998) to $188 (Hernández, et al., 2003) .
Still other studies suggest that a mixture of pasture and forest cover generates even higher hydrological benefits that contiguous forest (Aylward and Tognetti, 2002) . Hesitant to enter into this valuation debate, we have instead established an environmental index based upon both the scale of payments for the existing PES scheme in Mexico and the country's environmental priorities. Mexico's current payment program, which gives higher payments for cloud forests as opposed to forests of other types, is intended to reflect the higher hydrological value of the cloud forests. While changing the measure of benefits will change the distribution of payments, the main result of our study, that it is more efficient to pay for benefits which are at risk of being lost, will not change.
Mexico's PES program is intended to preserve the hydrological benefits provided by standing forest. We therefore design a simple index which reflects this objective as follows. Forests that are closer to major rivers are given a higher value than forests that do not have this attribute. Because a detailed river map of the country is not available, we used digital elevation models to establish where the highest flow of water across the landscape would be. Around areas of high flow, we calculated a buffer distance of one kilometer as the area whose erosion would most affect water quality and infiltration, and gave higher value to forests in these areas. In addition, we give higher values to those communities located in watersheds which have been classified as over-exploited. Over-exploited watersheds have been identified and mapped by INE. Finally, given that cloud forest is of particular concern because of its status as an endangered ecosystem in Mexico and is thought to produce a higher value of water services, we give them extra points as well. This differential reflects the price differential in the PES program as it is currently being implemented in Mexico -payments per hectare for cloud forests are 400 pesos, while for other types of forest they are 300. The current program was designed for payments to reflect the higher environmental value of cloud forest for water conservation. All forest types were defined according to the classification in the 2000 Forest Inventory. Table 3 describes the values that we use for ranking the environmental benefits provided by different types of forest in different locations. The average benefits per hectare are 30.6 points (sd 5.3) and the Gini coefficient is .11.
Payments and participation
To compare the payment schemes, we begin by assuming perfect foresight in predicting deforestation by using the observed deforestation rate between 1993 and 2000. We will relax this assumption in section 6 by using a predictive equation for deforestation in discussing implementation of the optimal scheme. We simulate the three schemes as if they were put into place in 1994 and we are observing the results one year later. The results are reported in tables 4 and 5. The flat payment ended up being $5 per hectare with the opportunity costs budget as a constraint. In the first payment program, all of the deforesting ejidos (61% of the sample) are paid in 1994, though the payments are quite unequally distributed, with a Gini coefficient of .81. In the flat payment program, the participation rate is much higher, at 87 percent, due to the fact that many ejidos without deforestation participate, though we do lose some of the deforesters with an opportunity cost higher than the flat payment offer. The distribution of these payments is much more equitable, with a Gini of .32. In the optimal constrained program, where we use 2/3 the budget of the first program, we have less than 2/3 participation (57%) and a Gini coefficient of 0.77, indicating the high inequality of payment distribution. Table 5 highlights the tradeoffs that exist between the inequality of the second and third programs and their efficiency. The total number of hectares deforested in the sample between 1994 and 2000 is 22,667, which is the amount enrolled in the opportunity cost program. Despite its higher participation, the flat payments program enrolls less than a third of the total hectares at risk of deforestation, 6,732 hectares, and the amount of environmental benefits per dollar spent, at .08, is also less than a third of that of the opportunity costs program. This is due to the fact that it enrolls many ejidos that do not have positive deforestation. The optimal distribution of the constrained budget, shown in column three, results in the enrollment of 19,225 hectares, which is nearly all of those at risk and an efficiency level of .35, four times higher than that of the flat payments scheme. Table 6 illustrates another measure of efficiency -the dollar amount paid for each hectare at risk of deforestation. Note that this is extremely large for the flat payment scheme (despite the fact that those with zero deforestation cannot be included) at $7,610 per hectare and smallest for the optimal strategy, which pays $86 per hectare on average. This very high number from the flat payments results from the fact that a very high price is paid for hectares that have a very low risk of deforestation. This is effectively a form of leakage of program funds to non-critical forests.
Who gets the payments?
In this section we examine the distribution of both the flat payments program and the most efficient payment program over different structural and social characteristics of participants. Table 7 shows the distribution of the flat payments program and the most efficient payments over size and poverty classes. In the case of the payments by poverty class, we consider per capita receipts rather than total payments. This is calculated under the assumption that payments at the community level will be shared equally between members. Participation in the flat program is much higher in all area classes, while it increases across classes in the optimal constrained program. This is due to the fact that deforestation in larger communities is higher. Efficiency, which is relatively constant across distance classes in the optimal case, is increasing with area in the flat payments program because as the properties get larger, the flat payments program is more likely to enroll hectares at risk of deforestation.
We see an interesting result with regards to equity. Although participation in both programs is higher for the poor than it is for the non-poor, it is relatively greater in the optimal program -63 versus 50% -than it is in the flat payments program -89 versus 85%. In addition, the optimal program allocates a greater share of the budget to the poor -61 as opposed to 54 %. At an individual level, however, we find that payments per capita to the poor, $51, are much lower than to the non-poor, who receive $135
per capita. This is likely the result of the smaller endowments of environmentally valuable resources among poorer and indigenous ejidos, which are also likely to have more members among which to divide the payments.
Implementation with predicted deforestation rate, I
In order to implement payment schemes which take deforestation risk into account, it is necessary to use the predicted rather than the actual deforestation rate. Using the actual deforestation to predict hectares at risk would induce strategic behavior on the part of ejidos. This section focuses on the application of two predictions of the deforestation rate to the most efficient program. Whatever prediction is chosen, it must be based exclusively on determinants x e that are truly exogenous to the behavior of the ejido (so that the scheme does not reward bad behavior), i.e., physical endowments of the ejido (area of different types of land, maybe on per capita basis), and structural characteristics such as distance, population, ethnicity, etc. We assume a uniform deforestation rate per ejido (i.e., all categories j of forest have the same deforestation rate τ e ), and perform the estimation on the observed sample of ejidos. Although this estimation gives prediction of the expected conditional deforestation rate τ x e ( ) in the population of ejidos of characteristic x e , the actual optimal rate of deforestation of a specific ejido e remains unknown to outsiders: τ e =τ x e ( ) + u e , where u e represent the idiosyncratic shock or behavior of the ejido, drawn from the estimated distribution N 0,σ 2 ( ) .
Armed with this analysis, we simulate the most efficient scheme based on the predicted deforestation rate τ e as follows: We first rank ejidos by decreasing ratio of environmental benefits over opportunity cost (which is independent of the deforestation rate), as we did above. We then pay the predicted conditional expected deforestation τ e F ej proportionately to the expected opportunity cost P e,I = c e j ∑ 1 + µ ( )τ e F ej starting with those with the highest ratio until the budget P is exhausted.
A specific ejido will accept the scheme if the payment compares favorably to the opportunity cost of its optimal deforestation rate, i.e., if: P e,I ≥ c eτ e + u e ( ) j ∑ F ej which can also be written:
This shows that if the payment is set at the expected opportunity cost, i.e., µ = 0 , all the ejidos with higher deforestation rates than the average will not accept the contract. Conversely, all ejidos with predicted rates lower than the average are compensated for their "good" behavior. By proposing a higher payment, µ > 0 , the program faces a trade-off in paying more than necessary for many ejidos but attracting more of them into the scheme. It follows that the optimal value for the payment level µ is determined by the overall optimization program:
s.t.
Pr u e ≤ µτ e ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ P e,I e ∑ ≤ P .
Two prediction equations
We present in table 8 two different prediction equations for deforestation. The first is a parsimonious specification, containing only easily observable, mostly physical variables, while the second includes a range of variables associated with deforestation behavior in common property communities (see Alix-Garcia, de Janvry, and Sadoulet, 2005) . The former represents a technique suitable for application in policy settings. The intention of presenting both options is to see how much targeting precision is lost in omitting variables representing community behavior.
The first estimation includes total ejido area, forest area, forest squared and forest cubed, the average distance to, slope and altitude of the forested area of the ejido, interactions of these terms, a dummy for if the ejido practices forestry or not, and the number of ejido members in 1990. None of these variables is easily changed by community members. Among these variables, the largest impacts on deforestation are through the size of the forest in 1994, the average slope of the forested area, and if the ejido practices forestry or not. The second specification includes, in addition to the physical variables, some characteristics that might influence group behavior, such as the number of people per household with secondary education, average size of individual parcels, the Gini coefficient of the distribution of private parcels, the ratio of member to total population in the ejido, and the predicted proportion of the population receiving Progresa -an educational subsidy program distributed to the poor. The largest impacts come from the Gini coefficient and the predicted proportion of the population receiving Progresa. The second specification shows a small gain in the regression adjusted R-squared over the parsimonious specification -from .38 to .42. This suggests that the second specification has superior predictive power over the first. In general, however, an R-squared of .38 is quite respectable for such a cross-sectional estimation.
Since there is not much gain from the expansion of the variable set in (2), Table 9 shows the payments calculated using only the parsimonious (1) specification. The efficiency level is considerably lower than that of the most efficient program using the actual deforestation rates, at .35, but is still twice as efficient as the flat payments' .08. As in the actual program, the Gini coefficient of payments for the predicted program is considerably higher than that of the flat payments program, which has a value of .32.
This leads us to the question of where the misallocation of payments occurs. Table 10 shows the characteristics of communities with payments in different error categories. The type II error comes entirely from deforestation rates that are estimated to be positive for ejidos that in reality had no deforestation. These communities also have very high benefits and low opportunity costs, which means they ranked quite high on our benefits to cost scale. Communities with type I error have very high deforestation rates (and were under-predicted) . In addition, their opportunity costs are large relative to the benefits that their land provides.
In sum, the more worrying type I error comes from ejidos with very high opportunity costs and very high rates of deforestation. These are also communities with somewhat low environmental benefits per hectare. In avoiding the strategic behavior associated with using observed deforestation rates, we end up with a lower level of environmental benefits per dollar spent, though this is still nearly twice as high as the efficiency level generated by using a flat payments program.
Conclusion
The most important contribution of this paper is to point out that including risk into the targeting of environmental services programs can great increase their efficiency. We illustrate this point by comparing a flat payment scheme to a scheme which takes into account the risk of deforestation. We simulate three programs: a flat payment scheme, a payment of opportunity cost for each hectare of forest at risk of deforestation, and, in order to illustrate the optimal manner of dealing with a budget constraint, a program which distributes payments according to the highest benefit/cost ratio and pays the opportunity cost for each hectare of forest at risk of deforestation. Comparing these approaches, we find that the most egalitarian approach is to pay a flat rate per hectare per year but to cap the number of allowable hectares. This is also the least efficient strategy in terms of environmental benefit per dollar spent. The highest efficiency comes from maximizing environmental benefits per dollar spent. The driving force behind these results is the leakage inherent in ignoring deforestation risk in the targeting process -in a program which gives the same payment for any hectare of forest very high prices are paid to conserve hectares of forest that were at no risk of being lost in the first place.
When we consider the distribution of payments of the flat and efficient programs according to characteristics of recipient communities, we find that in the case of the efficient program, larger and receive the lion's share of the budget, although they are not always the most efficient in providing environmental services. We also find that have higher participation rates, get a larger proportion of the budget and provide higher benefits per dollar spent that non-poor ejidos. In the optimal program, payments per member to the poor and indigenous are much lower than to their counterparts, reflecting the fact that environmentally valuable resources per capita are higher among the non-poor and nonindigenous. In the more egalitarian flat scheme, the budget is distributed relatively equally across size, and poverty classes, and payments to the poor and non-poor are equal.
Finally, we also address one of the important factors in implementing a scheme which accounts for deforestation risk. In order to avoid strategic behavior, one must use predicted deforestation using non-manipulable variables. We show that there is little advantage in venturing beyond easily observable variables in order to make this prediction. There is an efficiency loss in using the prediction as opposed to the actual rate of forest loss, but a program using the predicted deforestation rate is still twice as efficient as a flat payment program.
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